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SUMMARY: In this article, we will describe the sameness of existing in a meaningless 
world as it is expressed in the literary works of Franz Kafka, Boris Vian, and Murakami 
Haruki. Existence and meaninglessness will be analyzed as they are closely linked to the 
changing frontiers between good and evil as well as to the unknowable self. Existence and 
meaninglessness cannot be described without referring to existential categories, such as 
suffering, freedom, temporality, death, hope, and despair. Kafka was basically concerned 
with the unknowable meaning of existence. He interpreted the world in a Hobbesian way 
(the primacy of self-interest and search for power). But above all, Kafka’s hope in 
humankind remains the ultimate power people should use to fight existentially rooted 
meaninglessness. Vian rather focused on the unknowable meaning of good-evil and was 
closer to a Nietzschean transmutation of values. Murakami criticized the static frontiers 
between the real and the unreal. He unveiled the unknowable meaning of good-evil, self 
and existence. Like Bergson, Murakami was quite concerned with simultaneous durations 
and the meaning of temporality. Also, similarly to Sartre, Murakami was emphasizing 
existential freedom and the meaning of death. Kafka, Vian, and Murakami have thus 
widened the scope of the unknowable.  
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Introduction 
 
Could novels express basic dimensions of moral experience that cannot be 
described in philosophical treatises? According to Martha Nussbaum (2006: 47-48), reading 
novels makes our emotional intelligence and our moral imagination increasing. Even the 
best philosophical texts could not learn us what novels actually mirror from reality. 
Nussbaum analyzed Henry James’ The Golden Bowl. In that novel, James talked about 
morality: moral action involves higher levels of intelligence than immoral behavior (1972: 
87). In his Albertine disparue (2001: 258), Marcel Proust claimed that even immoral persons 
are experiencing moral indignation: the object of moral indignation among moral and 
immoral personalities will not be the same. James and Proust did not agree with the 
consequences of immorality. However, James’ and Proust’s literary works express how 
novels could convey philosophical import. Through their characters’ life, James and Proust 
unveiled how morality and immorality are experienced by individuals. According to Jean-
Paul Sartre (1969: 30-32), writers unveil the world and are thus projecting to change it. 
Writers are presenting the world in a way that readers cannot ignore it. Readers are 
responsible for what the world is actually becoming. Sartre’s dramas (particularly Les 
Séquestrés d’Altona) described basic sentiments (love, hate, fear) as they are arising from 
historical situations (Sartre, 2005: 251-252). Writers are thus accomplishing a 
philosophically-oriented and historically-based task. 
Nussbaum (1990: 4-6) described two basic claims about the writer’s art. On one 
hand, any literary text has an organic connection between its form and its content. The 
import of the text is a set of thoughts and ideas, a worldview which is formalized in words 
and sentences. On the other hand, any literary text conveys some truth claims about human 
existence that cannot be fully developed in philosophical treatises. Literary text makes an 
intrinsic link between philosophical ideas and daily life. Both claims about the writer’s art 
could be observed in Henry James’ and Marcel Proust’s literary works. We will analyse 
Kafka’s, Vian’s and Murakami’s novels in taking such claims into account. We will unveil 
philosophical ideas as they permeate the structure and form of Kafka’s, Vian’s and 
Murakami’s novels. Novels express the basic link between being and communication as it is 
rooted in human quest for truth. Being is communication, and communication is being 
(Murakami, 2011b: 147). In a way or another, Kafka, Vian and Murakami criticized Truth-
itself, and more generally, the thing-in-itself. Everything remains unknown since there is 
no-thingness. There is no in-itself. Essence does not exist. Truth is nothing but an 
existential quest. The existential search for Truth implies communicational exchanges. 
Truth is much more connected with the unknown than with knowledge. Searching for 
truth does not imply to widen the scope of our knowledge, but rather to seize the all-
embracing unknowable. 
Kafka, Vian, and Murakami described the sameness of existing from three basic 
existential perspectives: (1) the unknown frontiers between good and evil, and the meaning 
of truth and justice; (2) the unknowable self; (3) the unknown basis of existence. What-it-
means-to-exist refers to existentials whose meaning remains unknown: interpretation and 
freedom, temporality and death, hope and despair. Kafka, Vian and Murakami used those 
three perspectives in order to define existential doubt as the ground of any meaning of life. 
Any meaning of life is basically subjected to existential doubt. As it is interpreted in a 
meaningless reality, the sameness of existing requires existential doubt. That’s why truth is 
never conceived as a given set of beliefs, values, virtues, rituals, and practices.  
 
 
 
 
 
MICHEL DION // THE UNKNOWABLE MEANING OF GOOD-EVIL 
REVISTA FORMA //VOL 11 PRIMAVERA 2015 // ISSN 2013-7761 // 53 
 
1. The Unknownable Meaning of Good-Evil 
 
We can always check the truthfulness of our prejudices. If we do not check their 
truthfulness, then we will know absolutely nothing: our knowledge will then mirror our 
prejudices. Nothing more. In this way, things, persons, and phenomena will not be able to 
be what-they-are. An open knowledge implies the challenge to check the truthfulness of 
our prejudices and to get rid of unjustified prejudices. Our knowledge is nothing but the 
instrument of being: we know things, persons, and phenomena in order to be ourselves 
(Kafka, 2007a: 10). Knowledge is not an end in itself (Kafka, 2004: 65). However, every 
knowledge process is linked to prejudices about things, persons, and phenomena. 
Prejudices are connected with human knowledge (Vian, 2011b: 193). Prejudices are 
inherently linked to the knowledge process (Gadamer, 1976: 103-40). Prejudices are an 
integral part of truth as process and path (Murakami, 2011d: 41). Our quest for truth makes 
us uncovering the existential questioning about good and evil. Truth does not only have 
moral dimension. But morality is an existential quest that makes an integral part of our 
search for truth. What is a good-wrong action? Coud we avoid wrong actions without 
undertaking right ones (Vian, 2011b: 31)? When we are focusing on rules and codes, we are 
losing our ability to be in relation with others (Kafka, 1957: 210; 1984: 34). 
Is evil connected to the inability to feel empathy and compassion towards suffering 
people? Some people are more deeply affected by others’ suffering (Murakami, 2009c: 291, 
387). Is evil still present in human heart, or is it something that could be externally guided? 
When evil has fully penetrated our heart, we do not need to believe in its power. Evil is 
then quite powerful and influential (Kafka, 2004: 39, 44). Evil does not have any self-
knowledge. Evil knows what is good. When we are undertaking wrong actions, we are 
aware that such actions are contradicting the sense of goodness. But the good knows 
nothing about what is wrong (Kafka, 2009a: 178, 186). Through socialization processes, we 
have learned some parameters of good-evil. That’s why we are usually undertaking right 
actions and avoiding wrong conducts. Such habits partly hinder our moral questioning 
about the nature of good and evil (Vian, 1994: 69). While undertaking right actions, we 
cannot avoid every kind of evil that follows from morally right conducts. According to 
Vian, human will is basically mischievous (Vian, 2009: 88). 
Morality is basically linked to truth and justice. On one hand, we must face the 
unknowable character of truth. We do not have access to Truth-itself (Kafka, 1984: 229). 
Then, what is the nature of lies, if truth cannot be defined and reached (Kafka, 2007a: 
246)? Lie is the by-product of fear: we are afraid of ourselves as well as of others (Kafka, 
2007b: 262). Any attempt to know Truth-itself is lie (Kafka, 2004: 60). Truth is always 
changing. Truth-itself as an eternal truth does not exist (Kafka, 2007b: 71). Any discourse, 
doctrine, or set of values, virtues, and rituals could convey some truths (Kafka, 2008: 559). 
But it could never be Truth-itself. There is no Truth-itself. Religious, spiritual, economic, 
social, or political ideologies can never claim to own Truth-itself. They are only conveying 
truth claims, that is, historically-rooted truths that could be contradicted by other truth 
claims. Being aware of our personal truth claims is the way to conquer our authentic 
powers. Everybody lives in-truth: everybody is searching for truth and is identifying given 
truth claims. But anybody can never own Truth-itself, since Truth-itself does not exist 
(Kafka, 2009a: 190). We cannot know what is true, because History is continuously 
rewritten. Past events can never be changed, even through rememberings (Murakami, 
2011d: 444; 2011e: 284; 2014: 199, 208-209, 291, 328). History is always going on. 
On the other hand, we must face the universal value of justice. In way or another, 
we are always connected to the social and political institutions of justice. Everything is 
related to justice. Institutions of justice never forget something that is socially and 
politically relevant (Kafka, 1957: 232, 254, 266). Everybody tries to rule over others. 
Human being tends to dominate others’ will (Kafka, 2005b: 367). Kafka seemed to be 
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influenced by an Hobbesian (egoistic) view on society and power (Hobbes, 1971: 198). Just 
effects do not necessarily follow from just motives (Murakami, 2011d: 418). Murakami 
referred to William Butler Yeats (1961: 112): "in dreams begins responsibility". Our 
responsibility begins with our thoughts, dreams, and ideas (Murakami, 2010a: 178-79, 187, 
278). Our future actions and decisions are rooted in the world we are dreaming about (our 
world-dream). World-dreams could be consciously developed, as it is the case in social, 
political, economic, or religious-spiritual ideologies. World-dreams could also be 
unconscious. 
Sartre (1980: 613-614) rightly said that I am always personally responsible for any 
war, either as soldier, or as radical dissident, or even as indifferent observer. Those three 
attitudes in face of war are rooted in different world-dreams: fighting for liberties (soldier), 
promoting peace (radical dissident), making business as usual (indifferent observer). In all 
cases, my world-dream makes me personally responsible for such war. Everybody is finite, 
imperfect being. That’s why one’s world-dream is continuously evolving and could become 
more and more consciously connected to daily life. As to its ultimate consequences, the 
world-dream of indifferent observers is the worst one. Imperfection requires uselessness 
(Murakami, 2004b: 10). What is imperfect is then perceived as useless. Indifferent 
observers are refusing existential predicament as it is mirroring human imperfection. 
Indifferent observers believe that human beings are not always (existentially) guilty. If it is 
the case, then there would not be any existential fate of guilt and condemnation following 
from an original sin (Kafka, 1957: 305, 343; 2007b: 217). Indifferent observers try to get rid 
of their existential guilt: they neglect their faults and put the emphasis on their self-interest 
(Kafka, 1957: 221). In some cases, indifferent observers are trying to safeguard their self-
esteem. As Kafka (2005b: 267) said, if I am always treated as a dog, I am encline to believe 
that I am a dog. So, indifferent observers do not want to feel moral responsibility for social 
evils, political autocracies, economic crises, and even religious-spiritual distortions. 
 
2. The Unknowable Meaning of Self 
Living beings are existentially alone. Why is it so necessary to be alone throughout 
our existence? Human being is born, lives, and will die alone. However, such empirical fact 
does not have any philosophical ground. It is a phenomenon we must accept, as it is. Our 
existential loneliness makes us aware of others’ existence. It makes us being-with-others 
(Kafka, 1992: 178). We are afraid to be alone, although (and perhaps because) our 
existential predicament implies to be-alone (Murakami, 2014: 22). However, we have very 
limited knowledge of others’ self. We even do not know ourselves very much (Sartre, 1965: 
329). That’s why the notion of self seems to be unknowable (Murakami, 2014: 147, 322-
323). Being-alone is closely linked to being-with-others. Both modes of being are 
connected to self-esteem. Everybody believes that he-she is able to have perfect 
realizations and self-accomplishment (Kafka, 2007c: 41). Self-esteem cannot be isolated 
from the full awareness of who-we-are (self-awareness). Self-esteem cannot be isolated 
from our self-confidence (Kafka, 2009c: 60; 2010: 132, 143). According to Murakami 
(2014, 21), we cannot measure our personal worth, since our self can never be measured. I 
am always the self that I am in the here-and-now (Murakami, 2011e: 158). My present self 
could be radically different from my prior selves (Murakami, 2014: 46). I could make a 
prior self coming back to life (Murakami, 2014: 354). However, it will be qualitatively 
different, since my situation in the here-and-now cannot be compared with the situation in 
which my prior self was born and has evolved. 
Part of my consciousness cannot be known (Murakami, 2011a: 562, 593). May I 
isolate myself from my self and feel my suffering as the pain of someone else (Murakami, 
2014: 49)? Is there an original self that tries sometimes to release itself from-the-bondage-
of-myself? Is this original self able to manifest itself through my actions and decisions 
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(Murakami, 2014: 55)? The self is continuously changing and can never remain the same 
(Murakami, 2014: 59). We can change ourselves, since we do not always precisely know 
what is really important for us (Murakami, 2014: 153). But if there is an originary self, then 
it would be an inner structure that was already there, even before my birth (Murakami, 
2014: 80). To what extent could my self-perception mirror my true self (Murakami, 2004b: 
75-6)? Throughout our personal life, we are progressively unveiling our true self. In doing 
so, we are losing ourselves since our true self is a self which must always be modified 
(Murakami, 2014: 211). The self is not free to remain static: it is always changing. The true 
self is the project to be oneself. If we believe in a specific state of mind as being our true 
self, then we have lost the project to become who-we-are. Believing in static self does not 
change the changing nature of the self. I am my self, and nobody else (Murakami, 2010b: 
271; 2012: 208). I am my own project-to-be that could never be confused with others’ 
project-to-be. Even if I believe that a given self is my true self, I cannot hinder my self to 
change. Such change will be either unconsciously realized, or consciously repressed. 
Against my will, my self is continuously changing. 
 
3. The Unknownable Meaning of Existence 
If the meaning of existence is unknowable, then we could hardly claim that 
existential categories could be precisely defined. Insofar as we cannot know the meaning of 
existence, then any meaning of freedom, temporality, death, hope, and despair is basically 
mirroring a specific interpretation that has nothing to do with categorial import. 
 
Interpretation and Freedom 
Our perception of the world is not necessarily in accordance with reality 
(Murakami, 2004b: 52). What seems to be real is not necessarily real for me. Things, events, 
and phenomena could lose their reality. The real and the unreal are mixed together 
(Murakami, 2014: 8, 173, 234, 267). We are basically unaware of our existence (Kafka, 
2009b: 26). What does it mean to truly exist (Murakami, 2011d: 491)? What-it-means-to-
exist is an interpretation. Everything is an interpretation, a way to build up reality (Kafka, 
2008: 298, 300). We should try to see reality as-it-is rather than deceiving ourselves (Kafka, 
1957: 230). Some things, phenomena, and events cannot be grasped through reasoning and 
intuition (Kafka, 2007a: 275). They simply cannot be understood since we are always 
uncertain about their meaning. Throughout our life experiences, the way we interpret given 
things, persons, phenomena, and events is evolving (Kafka, 2007c: 185). Names we give to 
things, phenomena and events are interpretations. We would like to see things as they were 
before we have interpreted them. But thing-in-itself does not exist. Everything is 
appearance rather than reality (Kafka, 2009b: 25-6, 55). As Nietzsche (1967: 165, 301-02, 
311) said, there is no thing-in-itself. 
Human freedom is both a sublime feeling and a sublime illusion (Kafka, 2004: 66-7; 
2007c: 189). Kafka clearly criticized the idea that human beings are supposedly not 
condemned to be free (Kafka, 2010: 137). Is the choice of freedom necessarily excluded 
(Kafka, 2007c: 197)? Is human freedom meaningless? Is it an expression of existential 
despair (Kafka, 1984: 26, 46, 140)? Sartre grounded his philosophy of freedom on Kafka’s 
principle of freedom. As it is rooted in human existence, freedom is process (Sartre, 1980: 
559). Being-free means to take responsibility for our own existence upon ourselves. I am 
totally accountable for who-I-am here and now and for the self I will become. Existence 
would me meaningless without such existential responsibility for who-we-are-becoming. As 
Murdoch (1997: 115; 2015: 80-82) rightly said, Kafkaian meaninglessness is not equivalent 
to Sartrean meaninglessness. Kafka described a meaningless world, while safeguarding basic 
hope: K. wishes to find out meaning of life. Sartre rather believed that there is no meaning 
of life we should live for. There is only freedom, that is, our being-free. Freedom is our 
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secret garden, that is, our project-to-be. Being-free implies that I am my project-to-be 
(Sartre, 1964: 20, 47, 71, 73, 131, 202). My self has no substance. It is rather the project-to-
be, that is, the continuous process of choosing potentialities-to-be (Sartre, 1965: 418). 
Freedom implies independent thinking, that is, the capacity to think by oneself 
(Murakami, 2014: 75). Murakami even asserted that philosophical questioning opens the 
door to the ultimate state of freedom. To be free is having a free spirit. Having freedom of 
thought means that we are taking decisions and undertaking given behaviors and must take 
responsibilities upon ourselves (Murakami, 2014: 192-193). Being-free is possible without a 
given set of constraints. Freedom cannot exist without frontiers. We should be relatively 
afraid of reasonable limitations (laws and penalties, social disapproval) and absolutely ready 
to destroy unreasonable limitations. We must both respect and hate social-legal-political-
religious constraints (Murakami, 2014: 76-77). Murakami referred to Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(1966: 50-2): "civilizations are born with regulations, and thus, with limitations to human 
freedom" (Murakami, 2010b: 429-30). 
 
Temporality and Our Having-to-Die 
Suffering is existentially grounded. We are suffering in the here-and-now (Kafka, 
2009a: 208). Human relationships are based on mutual understanding, respect, and 
compassion (Murakami, 2009c: 196, 281; 2010b: 31). We are living in the here-and-now. 
We do not master the next instant. Time flow cannot be controlled (Kafka, 2007a: 65). 
According to Henri Bergson (2007: 41-64), without time flow, space would not exist. Space 
and time flow are interdependent. Time is measured by movement. Temporally-based 
movement exists for those consciences which can measure time flow. Measuring time flow 
implies to distinguish the inner time and the time of things, events, and phenomena. It is 
one thing to measure symbolic-conventional time, which tries to objectively represent time 
flow. It’s quite another to observe felt-experienced time. One’s experienced time is 
equivalent to his-her subjective perception of real duration. According to Murakami (2014: 
79, 157), events and phenomena could make our perception of time flow completely 
disappear. Human being cannot rule over Time. He-she can only organize his-her personal 
duration (Murakami, 2014: 188). 
Bergson (1992: 412-414) asserted that duration is the continuity between successive 
states of consciousness. Any state of consciousness is already a substantial change, when 
compared with the prior state of consciousness. Duration characterizes an evolving 
(changing) consciousness and self (Bergson, 1969: 2-4). There are multiple states of 
consciousness, and we could observe a basic unity between all of them (Bergson, 1934: 
234). For everybody, duration is what he-she perceives as his-her own duration, that is, his-
her historically-based development. As Bergson (1992: 412-414) said, the existence of 
duration is equivalent to one’s awareness of his-her own duration. Every person has his-her 
own (unique) duration as it is experienced through inner life (Bergson, 1934: 234). Every 
evolving conscience has its own duration. However, there could be common moments 
(simultaneities) between such independent (individual) durations. According to Bergson 
(1992: 413-414; 1969: 9), the homogeneous time is the impersonal duration that makes 
such common instants possible. It helps us to measure time flow (Bergson, 1934: 228). 
Murakami (2014: 350) acknowledged the homogeneous time as something that could be 
perceived by every human being. Murakami (2014: 90) was more precisely referring to the 
homogeneous time, when asserting that two different temporalities have merged together. 
However, we cannot feel such existential-temporal merger without widening the scope of 
our perceptions. Murakami (2014: 100) referred to Aldous Huxley. According to Huxley 
(1977: 27), everything is in everything, the Whole is present in every thing. Perceptions 
cannot be really explained. They are morally neutral. Perceptions make us aware that 
everybody is an integral part of the Whole (Murakami, 2011d: 33; 2014: 101). 
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Murakami believed that the present is the progress of the past which is eroding the 
frontiers of future (Murakami, 2010b: 371). We only have access to interpretations of our 
past. And such interpretations are rooted in our here-and-now. According to Kafka, those 
who belong to the instant do not share the human (existential) predicament. Kafka thus 
mirrored Soeren Kierkegaard’s aesthetic life-view (Kierkegaard, 1992: 485-86, 520-28, 545-
46, 559-60). Those who belong to the instant live in-suffering: the meaning of their life is 
constituted by the various ways to avoid suffering. Other people are unconsciously 
determined by their past and their future: they cannot distinguish the influence of their past 
in their present life. They cannot know if past dreams and projects will actually be realized 
in their immediate future. According to Kafka, we should let future sleeping: our future will 
awake at the right time and will be determined by unconscious-uncontrollable processes 
(Kafka, 1992: 51-2, 63; 2008: 12, 40). 
Temporality is intrinsically linked to our having-to-die. Our empirical certainty that 
everything living being will die cannot make fear and anxiety totally disappear. We must 
understand what it means to exist, given the fact that we have-to-die. Understanding 
requires the extinction of fears (Murakami, 2010b: 542). Murakami referred to Joseph 
Conrad (Murakami, 2010a: 112, 115): our fear is rooted in our imagination (Conrad, 1946: 
218-25). Fear is the basic emotion (Kafka, 2007a: 65). Fear is due to the fact that we 
become aware of the causes of given things, phenomena, and events (Kafka, 2007c: 61). 
Fear is the ground of unhappiness. Happiness presupposes the absence of fear, but not 
necessarily the presence of courage (Kafka, 2008: 531). Anxiety is ontologically rooted, 
since it is the full awareness of existential finitude (Kafka, 2008: 161). Every living being 
has to die, since it is perishable (Kafka, 2007c: 166). The cruelty of death is unveiled by the 
fact that an apparent final end provokes a real suffering (Kafka, 2009a: 224). The 
unavoidable death is within my self, as a having-to-die (Murakami, 2010c: 322). What does 
it mean to live with the certainty of our having-to-die (Murakami, 2014: 80)? Murakami 
(2014: 103) seemed to agree with Confucius (1979: Book XI.12): it is useless to think about 
phenomena (such as death) we cannot know. Although we would know the after-life, we 
cannot check to what extent our knowledge rightly mirror the uniqueness-multiplicity of 
the after-life dimensions. 
 
Hope and despair 
Our doubt is existentially rooted and cannot be avoided (Kafka, 1984: 201, 219, 
224, 259, 272; 2007c: 189). Doubt and belief are by-products of human mind. Human 
being needs grounds for thinking and acting, although such grounds are continuously 
evolving. If we accept that the world is a world of ideas (intellectual world), then we get 
certainties and lose hope (Kafka, 2009a: 189, 194, 197). There is hope because the fact of 
existing makes uncertainties arising. If there would not be any uncertainty, then hope 
would be impossible. That’s why doubt is existentially rooted. We cannot avoid despair, 
since despair is an integral part of human existence. Despair means that there is no issue. 
There is no way to find out any inherent meaning of human existence. However, we can 
never know if the despair in which our being has been thrown is actually justified. Despair 
is provoked by our fate. Despair could give birth to the courage to take despair upon 
ourselves: something could get out of nothingness (Kafka, 2008: 320, 412, 520, 539-40). 
We always try to communicate something that cannot be explained, that is, truth (Kafka, 
2007b: 261-62). According to Max Brod (1962: 271-72, 276), Kafka believed in something 
indestructible within human heart and soul. That’s why Kafka’s interpretation of human 
existence tends to be optimistic. According to Kafka, human existence is made of despair, 
decreasing self-esteem, and frail hope, said Brod. Kafka believed that hope could overcome 
despair. The courage to take despair upon ourselves can only be rooted in our hope. In 
similar way, Murakami was referring to the energy of despair (Murakami, 2014: 353).  
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According to Murakami (2014: 94), we cannot distinguish subject and object. 
Something universal is overcoming every particular thing, event, or self (Murakami, 2014: 
95). Fedor Dostoyevsky (2004: 59-60) believed that human being has created Gods, and 
Gods have abandoned him-her to his-her existential predicament (Murakami, 2010a: 120). 
According to Vian, we cannot remain clear-headed, while believing in God (Vian, 2009: 
43). God is then the delight of the superfluous. If God would be useful, God would be an 
object besides other objects we could use in our daily life. What is useless has an infinite 
worth. According to Friedrich Nietzsche, God is dead: we have collectively killed God. 
Since the death of God, we are perceiving ourselves as an infinite nothingness. We do not 
have any other ultimately sacred and powerful being. Nietzsche believed that the death of 
God is the most historically important event, although people cannot easily grasp its direct 
and indirect consequences. The death of God has to be accepted and recognized by 
peoples and individuals (Nietzsche, 1982: 169-171). The disappearance of God from 
History does not mean that human being becomes a pure nothingness. Rather, human 
being is called to become the Overman. 
The Overman is characterized by free spirit, that is, a spirit which is not subjected 
to traditional virtues and reason. The Overman is the meaning of human being, as it is 
rooted in life processes. The Overman realizes a transmutation of values-virtues. Nothing 
that has been interpreted as being true is inherently true, since traditional virtues are 
denying any worth to life processes. The Overman’s morality does not presuppose that 
something is ultimately true. Rather, it is emphasizing life processes as the center of human 
life. Thus, every action promoting life processes is morally justified (Nietzsche, 1985: 22-
29, 323, 331, 347). According to Nietzsche, reason and (traditional) virtues are phenomena 
of human degeneration, since they fight life processes. That’s why they provoke existential 
nausea. Sartre (1966: 34) interpreted existential nausea as the awareness of our own finite 
existence. Existing means being-there, and thus not-to-be-necessary. We are afraid of 
existing, since we know our being is superfluous. Every action makes us more aware of our 
existential finitude. Existential nausea is provoked by the permanent awareness of such 
unavoidable finitude (Sartre, 1966: 185, 224, 238, 242). 
 
Conclusion 
Boris Vian and Murakami Haruki were quite influenced by Franz Kafka’s works. 
According to Murakami, Kafka did not describe human predicament, but rather the 
complex mechanisms of existing (2010b: 77; 2012: 275). Human predicament is always the 
same (Murakami, 2004b: 164; 2011b: 61). Kafka, Vian and Murakami have divergent 
opinions about the way some components of human existence should be interpreted. 
Kafka was basically concerned with the unknowable meaning of existence. He interpreted 
the world in an Hobbesian way (the primacy of self-interest and search for power). But 
above all, Kafka’s hope in humankind remains the ultimate power people should use to 
fight existentially-rooted meaninglessness. Vian rather focused on the unknowable meaning 
of good-evil and was closer to Nietzschean transmutation of values. Murakami criticized 
the static frontiers between the real and the unreal. He unveiled the unknowable meaning 
of good-evil, self, and existence. Like Bergson, Murakami was quite concerned with 
simultaneous durations and the meaning of temporality. Like Sartre, Murakami was 
emphasizing existential freedom and the meaning of death. Kafka, Vian, and Murakami 
have thus widened the scope of the unknowable. 
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